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‘What’s wrong – fundamentally wrong – with the way animals are treated (…) isn’t 
the pain, the suffering, isn’t the deprivation. (…) The fundamental wrong is the 
system that allows us to view animals as our resources, here for us – to be eaten, or 
surgically manipulated, or exploited for sport or money.’2 
 
Tom Regan made this claim 20 years ago. What he maintains is basically that the 
fundamental wrong is not the suffering we inflict on animals but the way we look at 
them. What we do to them, what we believe we are allowed to do to them, is 
dependent on how we perceive or conceptualize them. We not only treat them as 
resources but prior to this we already think of them as resources, and when we look at 
them, all we tend to see is resources. In our perception of them they exist not for 
themselves but ‘for us’. But obviously it can only be fundamentally wrong in a moral 
sense to view them that way if it is wrong in a factual sense, that is, if animals are in 
fact not ‘for us’. But is it wrong?  
 
Animals as ends in themselves 
 
According to Immanuel Kant, our moral duties to our fellow human beings can all be 
traced back to the one rule never to treat each other (and oneself) merely as means but 
always at the same time as ends. The reason for this is that human beings, by virtue of 
their being capable of acting out of respect for the moral law and thus autonomously, 
have an intrinsic or absolute value that Kant calls dignity. That human beings have 
such an absolute value means, for Kant, that they (and in general all rational beings) 
by their very nature exist as ends in themselves.3 Thus the imperative always to treat 
them as ends and never merely as means is only an acknowledgement of their true 
nature. In contrast, all other beings have only a relative, extrinsic value and do not 
exist as ends in themselves. All value they can possibly have they do have by reason 
of their being valued by humans. It does not matter whether or not they are alive or 
conscious or sentient: they can never be ends in themselves unless they possess reason 
and are capable of acting out of respect for the moral law. Since animals lack this 
ability they are, again by their very nature, not ends in themselves, and we have no 
direct moral obligations towards them and are free to treat them, if it suits us, merely 
as means to our ends. Rational beings that exist as ends in themselves are called 
persons (the word ‘person’ being a nomen dignitatis), whereas all other beings, 
including all animals, are most appropriately called, and regarded as, things.4  
 
The idea that animals might literally exist as means (thus justifying their being treated 
as means) is reminiscent of the Stoics’ claim that the whole purpose of their existence 
is their usefulness to human beings.5 Kant, however, did not go quite that far. He 
merely made the negative claim that animals do not exist as ends, but not the positive 
claim that they actually do exist as means. The Stoics tended to think of animals as 
predisposed for human use, as natural born instruments,6 whereas Kant 
conceptualized them as ‘things’ because in his view they lack the necessary 
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requirements for moral considerability. So in all practical, that is, moral respects, 
animals are just like any other non-rational thing. Their existence, their needs and 
desires, cannot be the basis for moral obligations. Morally speaking their lives and 
their well-being are a matter of indifference and there is no answer to the question 
how they ought to be treated. They do not have dignity (that is, an absolute value) but 
only a price, which means that they ‘can be replaced by something else which is 
equivalent’.7 Thus, according to Kant, replaceability is the hallmark not only of 
inanimate things but of all living beings except humans. 
 
However, replaceability is, contrary to what Kant suggests, not a property an object 
can possess as such, intrinsically, but only in relation to someone to whom it is 
replaceable and in relation to a certain aspect under which it is viewed. Anything can 
be replaceable for us if what matters to us is not the thing in its particularity, 
individuality, and uniqueness, but rather the thing as a representative of its kind. 
Because only then another thing of the same kind will do just as well. But what kind a 
thing is, again is not a question of its intrinsic properties but, instead, of our interest in 
it. To use a fairly trivial example, a coffee machine is not a coffee machine because it 
makes coffee (since it does many other things as well, and sometimes it does not 
make coffee). Rather, it is a coffee machine because it is designed to make coffee, we 
expect it to make coffee, and we primarily use it to make coffee. If it breaks we can 
either get it repaired or buy a new one, and it doesn’t really matter which, because it 
is, to us, replaceable. We can replace it precisely because it does not matter to us 
which coffee machine we have as long as it does what it is supposed to do, that is, 
make coffee. Similarly, when it is suggested that animals are by their very nature 
replaceable they are already thought of as performing a certain function or having a 
certain use. We have an idea of what we want from them, how they should be like, 
what makes them good representatives of their kind. And this idea makes animals 
replaceable. That is why it is quite wrong to argue that we have no moral obligations 
to animals because they are, by their very nature, replaceable. Rather, we define them 
as replaceable because that provides us with a convenient justification not to pay any 
attention to what is good for them. Being a mere thing means being replaceable in the 
sense that there is no moral reason why we should not replace it. This is intuitively 
plausible with respect to inanimate objects like coffee machines. Although they are 
not in themselves replaceable there is also nothing about them that puts us under an 
obligation not to replace them. In that respect, however, animals are not mere things. 
They are different. They do have a good, and this good is their good and not anyone 
else’s. 
 
Judging by the way they behave, if animals could talk they would certainly disagree 
with both Kant and the Stoics. Their actions, and that is the only thing we can judge 
them by, are far from suggesting that they view themselves as replaceable, on the 
contrary. They are primarily oriented towards their own survival and to the attainment 
and defence of their own individual good. They clearly care for what happens to them. 
There is nothing in the way animals behave or in the way their bodies are shaped and 
organized that supports the idea that the purpose of their existence is anything but 
their own good. It certainly is not our good. And they would also regard themselves 
and their existence as ends in themselves. They may in fact be treated as means but 
they exist as ends in themselves. Regarding them merely as means, as things that can 
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be used and replaced at will, is therefore not adequate to what they are. It is a practical 
denial of their independent existence and their biological integrity as a realization of 
their own good. 
 
As the British philosopher William Wollaston has pointed out, a ‘true proposition 
may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by deeds, as well as by 
express words or another proposition.’8 Since our actions are expressive of the beliefs 
we have we can declare that things are not as they are simply by acting in a certain 
way. If I, for instance, break a promise, I act as if such a promise has never been made 
and by acting that way (wrongly) declare that it has not been made. If I steal from 
somebody I treat someone else’s property as my own and thereby declare that it is 
mine while in fact it is not. Wollaston believed that this fact explained the difference 
between good and evil or morally right and wrong actions. He gives the following 
illustration: 
 
To talk to a post, or otherwise treat it as if it was a man, would 
surely be reckoned an absurdity, if not distraction. Why? because 
this is to treat it as being what it is not. And why should not the 
converse be reckond as bad; that is, to treat a man as a post; as if he 
had no sense, and felt no injuries, which he doth feel; as if to him 
pain and sorrow were not pain; happiness not happiness. This is 
what the cruel and unjust do.9 
 
However, it is not quite clear why it should be more morally wrong to treat a human 
being like a post than to treat a post like a human being, or more wrong to treat an 
animal as if it were a mere thing than to treat a mere thing as if it were an animal or a 
human person. Whereas the former seems to be morally wrong the latter just seems 
crazy. Somebody who is treating a post as if it were alive and sentient is out of their 
right mind, but their actions do not seem morally reprehensible. Wollaston realized 
that it would not be plausible to consider all actions that are expressive of a false 
proposition as equally morally wrong and tried to account for the different degrees of 
wrongness by distinguishing between actions with respect to the ‘importance’ of their 
consequences. Some actions are more wrong than others because certain things matter 
more than others. When, for instance, the happiness, welfare or life of a creature is at 
stake, denying their being what they are is more important than if their happiness, 
welfare and life were not affected. Now, it may seem that, by acknowledging that the 
degree in which an act is morally wrong depends on its consequences, Wollaston 
seriously undermines his claim that acts are morally wrong because they somehow 
deny the truth. However, Wollaston could defend his view by arguing that if an action 
causes suffering but does not deny the truth then it is not morally wrong despite the 
suffering it causes. For instance – as both Plato and Kant have argued – punishing 
someone for their crimes is not only justified (and perhaps advisable for the good of 
society) but also something that is literally owed to them. By being punished they are 
acknowledged as morally responsible beings, (in Kantian terms) as autonomous 
agents and thus as beings that possess intrinsic value and dignity. Did one refrain 
from punishing them one would in effect deny them their humanity, that is, deny them 
to be what they in fact are. Hence, since they are treated as morally responsible 
human beings no moral wrong is being committed even though suffering may be 
inflicted on them. It would appear then that even though a practical denial of the truth 
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may not be sufficient to declare an act to be (seriously) morally wrong it may still be a 




Generally speaking, our practices influence and change the way we look at the objects 
involved in them. Conversely, the way we look at things determines the role we 
assign to them in our practices. Biotechnology is a human practice that has (and 
reflects) a tendency to transform living beings into scientific objects and into mere 
things. I call this process of transformation ‘reification’. The term ‘reification’ is often 
used when abstract concepts are being treated as if they represented concrete things 
which can act and be acted upon. Reification in this sense is a fallacy, very similar in 
kind to the fallacy that Alfred North Whitehead called the ‘fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness’.10 To give an example, ‘pleasure’ or ‘happiness’ tend to be reified in 
traditional utilitarian thinking when they are disconnected from the individual beings 
that are happy and feel pleasure and treated as if they had an existence of their own so 
that they can meaningfully be quantified, added and subtracted. The term ‘life’ is also 
a good candidate for this kind of reification. Life gets reified when, for instance, in the 
eyes of those who think of themselves as pro-life activists life acquires the status of an 
entity that has a value independent of those whose life it is. The status of being alive, 
which in fact qualifies a substance, is regarded and treated as if it were itself a 
substance: life as such. 
 
However, this kind of reification is not what I wish to talk about here, at least not 
primarily. When I speak about the ‘reification of life’ I want the term ‘reification’ to 
be understood in the old Marxist sense of treating a subject as if it were a mere thing. 
The German word is ‘Verdinglichung’, which literally means ‘turning [something that 
is not a thing] into a thing’. What the term addresses is the practical tendency to make 
a commodity (i.e., something that has a price but no intrinsic value) of an entity by 
disregarding every aspect of it other than those that can be utilized. Following the 
Kantian lead, this tendency is regarded particularly offensive when it is exhibited 
towards human beings, because humans should never be treated only as means but 
always as ends. But if animals, as I have pointed out above, are also ends in 
themselves in the sense that they aim at the fulfilment of their own being and do not 
primarily serve any other ends than their own by holding on to their lives and their 
particular kind of existence,11 then we may just as well adopt the Kantian imperative 
and conclude that animals, too, should never be treated merely as means but always at 
the same time as ends. 
 
The concept of reification originates in Marx’s critique of Capitalist society and was 
elaborated by Georg Lukacs.12 Only recently it was given a book-length treatment by 
Axel Honneth,13 who interpreted reification in a much wider context as an expression 
of ‘Anerkennungsvergessenheit’, which literally means forgetfulness of recognition. 
Honneth cites Adorno and Horkheimer who once remarked that all reification is a 
forgetting. What is forgotten is that the other is a subject just like oneself or, in more 
general terms, that the world outside does not exist exclusively for our convenience. 
This forgetting is expressed in a certain lack of emotional involvement or indifference 
– ‘Teilnahmslosigkeit’. Reification is the effect of habitually adopting the perspective 
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of a distant, neutral observer, a perspective that makes all objects appear as mere 
things. A certain primary relatedness to the world is lost. 
 
The adoption of this neutral perspective is generally supposed to be a precondition of 
good science. Thus reification is required in order to conduct a scientific inquiry. In 
H.G. Wells’s novel The Island of Dr Moreau we find this idea perfectly expressed by 
Dr Moreau himself when he remarks to his involuntary guest Prendick:  
 
Pain! Pain and pleasure – they are for us, only so long as we wriggle in 
the dust (...) You see, I went on with this research just the way it led me. 
That is the only way I ever heard of research going. I asked a question, 
devised some method of getting an answer, and got – a fresh question. You 
cannot imagine what this means to an investigator, what an intellectual 
passion grows upon him. You cannot imagine the strange and colourless 
delight of these intellectual desires. The thing before you is no longer an 
animal, a fellow-creature, but a problem.14 
 
This particular way of looking at animals is the result of what Michael Lynch called 
the ‘transformation of the animal body into a scientific object’.15 After having 
observed the behaviour and language of neuroscientists performing electron 
microscopic studies of regenerative processes in the brain of mammals, Lynch 
described the tension between mutually exclusive representations of laboratory rats, 
which on the one hand were initially perceived and throughout the experiments 
implicitly assumed to be naturalistic creatures, but were on the other hand spoken of 
and eventually treated as analytic products of research. The ‘naturalistic animal’ is the 
animal of our ordinary perception and interaction. Its presence is necessary but 
remains systematically unacknowledged in the research products. ‘The ‘analytic 
animal’ therefore becomes the real animal in a scientific system of knowledge, while 
tacitly depending upon the naturalistic animal for its practical foundation.’16 There is 
no indication in the way those experiments were conducted and the way the results 
were expressed that the entities being used were actually living beings. Every aspect 
that is supposedly irrelevant to the purpose of the experiment is systematically 
ignored. By gradually transforming the naturalistic animal – the living, conscious, and 
sentient creature – into an analytic entity and identifying the former with the latter, 
modern experimental science exemplifies forgetfulness. The knowledge is actually 
there but it is systematically suppressed and never openly acknowledged although 
implicit in the way researchers prepare the animals to yield the results they wish to 
attain: ‘Animals are treated as holistic, living, reactive subjects to be soothed, cajoled, 
tricked, and gently led through procedures that transform them into analytic 
subjects.’17 In the articles that were published after the experiments, animals were no 
longer present as living beings but as cases ‘which demonstrated an abstract 




Various companies offer so-called research models for purchase. Sinclair, for 
instance, offer ‘miniature swine as Models for Human Diabetes’. On their website, 
Sinclair first state what a serious problem the disease poses, and that for the lack of 
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suitable large animal models, diabetes research has not sufficiently developed. Then, 
the product is presented: 
 
Miniature swine have many characteristics similar to humans that make 
them a suitable species to model human diseases. Miniature swine are 
omnivores, easy to handle, raise few ethical considerations, offer similar 
size to adult humans, have several organ systems very similar to humans in 
term of anatomy, physiology and metabolism, and test compounds can be 
administered through all routes of delivery, including trans-cutaneous 
delivery systems (patches). (…) Sinclair offers a new induced model of type 
2 diabetes with dyslipidemia in miniature swine. The dyslipidemia 
observed is very similar to the one of diabetic humans and early 
atherosclerosis lesions have also been detected. The similarities of the 
lipid metabolism, vascular anatomy, capacity and collateral circulation of 
the coronary arteries between swine and humans make this animal model 
even more attractive.19 
 
What is being offered here is not a conscious living being that cares for its own 
existence and strives to attain and preserve its own kind of good, but a model. A 
model is a kind of representation. It stands for something else. Normally it is a 
simplified version of a complex process or state which can be used to facilitate 
understanding of, or increase knowledge about, that process or state. If we want to 
know how something works or what effects certain actions have on it, and we cannot 
get hold of the real thing, or do not, for one reason or another, want to use it, a model 
is needed that is likely to provide the same information. A model may even be better 
suited for the purpose of gaining information because it can be constructed in such a 
way that many irrelevant aspects of what it is meant to represent are eliminated. 
However, an animal that is being used as a model for a human disease is not in itself a 
simplified version of that disease. It is, even when it is used a model, still a living 
being that cares for itself and has its own particular good. So instead of being 
eliminated, all those details that are deemed irrelevant for the purpose of gaining a 
certain kind of information are simply ignored - as much as this is possible. The 
properties that are explicitly acknowledged and highlighted are not properties of what 
Lynch called the naturalistic animal but either properties of the analytic animal or 
properties that facilitate their being turned into analytic animals. Being omnivores 
they can be fed almost anything, so feeding them will not be a problem. They are easy 
to handle, so no inconveniencies or surprises that might force their user to 
acknowledge their naturalistic side are to be expected. Their organ systems, 
metabolism and anatomy are similar to those of humans. The disease affects their 
bodies in the same way it affects the bodies of humans. 
 
An animal model is perceived and used as a representation. Although a representation 
need have no similarity with what it represents (just as, conversely, a thing can be 
similar to another without representing it),20 in the case of animal models a certain 
similarity is necessary. The similarity is needed in order to achieve the research goal: 
it is the primary reason for using it as a model. On the other hand, the model also 
needs to be different, for if there weren’t any difference between the representation 
and what it represents, one could just as well use the real thing. In this case the real 
thing would be a human being suffering from Diabetes. Yet experimenting on humans 
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is thought to be unethical. In contrast, swine allegedly ‘raise few ethical 
considerations’, so the reason for not using human beings does not apply to animals. 
Ethical concerns appear to weigh less or not exist at all in the case of animals, and this 
justifies their being used as a model. In fact, however, it is the way they are 
represented that allows us to lower their moral status to a negligible degree.  
 
In every act of representation there is an object (that which is represented) and a mode 
of representation (that as which the object is represented). Every representation 
involves a certain characterization of an object. In the case of animal models, the 
animal represents a human as the bearer of a certain disease. It is meant to exemplify 
this human disease. Being meant to exemplify, the animal model is, qua model, a 
reduction. Similarity is important only in a certain respect, whereas in other respects 
the dissimilarity is equally important, namely dissimilarity in respect to everything 
that might be considered ethically relevant, such as life, sentience, conscience, an 
inner perspective, a subjective existence. These properties are not positively absent in 
animal models but they are systematically overlooked. Hence the dissimilarity is not 
intrinsic to the object but a mental, linguistic and social construction. It is a result of 
what Honneth calls forgetfulness (of a prior recognition). Everything that is not 
relevant to the purpose (and that may possibly create a meaningful relationship 
between the animal and its user) is pushed into the background, is suppressed. The 
animal is regarded and, more importantly, subsequently treated as a mere model or, in 
more general terms, a tool. Its intrinsic value is concealed and its instrumental value 
emphasized. At the same time the instrumentalization is being hidden. The fact that 
the animal only becomes a model by virtue of the way humans relate to it 
(conceptualize and treat it) is forgotten, and what is essentially the result of an 
interest-guided contraction of one’s visual and mental focus is transformed into an 
ontological fact. Awareness that one is using an animal as a model is lost and replaced 
by the belief that one is actually using an animal model. 
 
The process of reification passes through several stages. The starting point is an 
individual living, conscious, and sentient animal. This is initially recognized but 
eventually forgotten (Honneth’s Anerkennungsvergessenheit). A selective use of 
language is then employed to deflect attention from those properties that tend to be 
regarded as giving rise to intrinsic value and thus moral status, and simultaneously to 
confine attention to properties that are most likely to be instrumentally valued. The 
next and most important step is the transformation of an instrumental perspective into 
an ontological fact: the animal now appears to not only be used as a model but to be a 
model, thereby retroactively justifying its being used as a model. As a result, the 
animal appears to be an indefinitely usable thing that is completely at our disposal.  
 
Incidentally, this crucial transformation of an instrumental perspective into an 
ontological fact can be seen as an instance of reification in the first sense of the word, 
which I mentioned briefly at the beginning of this paper. It is an instance of treating 
an abstract concept as if it represented a concrete thing. Not only the animal is reified 
(by being conceptualized and treated as a mere thing) but also the term ‘model’ is 
being reified by using it as if it represented the whole reality of the object it refers to 
instead of a certain use this object can be subjected to. 
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Language helps to sustain this crucial deception. The way we speak about a thing not 
only reflects but also shapes our perception of it and facilitates the process of 
reification. Just as it is important in warfare to verbally dehumanize the enemy and all 
potential victims of one’s own aggression in order to dissolve possible moral scruples 
and instinctive inhibitions towards killing fellow human beings,21 animals are being 
transformed verbally in order to deflect attention from the fact that they are individual 
living creatures that care for their lives and have a good of their own just as we do. 
What needs to be forgotten is that animals are not made for our convenience, do not 
exist as means to our ends, but are ends in themselves. Only natural beings can be 
ends in themselves. Pure (non-living) artefacts, on the other hand, are never ends in 
themselves because they are made for a certain purpose. By employing a certain 
terminology natural beings are for all practical purposes turned into artefacts. ‘To 
speak of organisms as machines legitimizes our treatment of them as artefacts, as 
completely knowable and transparent objects and of their lives as having no ethical 
significance.’22 
 
Super-reification through genetic modification 
 
A further step in the reification of living creatures is reached when animals are 
genetically manipulated in such a way that those features that, for some reason or 
other, hamper our use of them are eliminated and other features that are conducive to 
their intended use are accentuated or added. Quite rightly Lynch remarked that ‘the 
genetic design and domestication of laboratory animals anticipates their use as 
analytic subjects.’23 Animals are not only spoken of as tools and treated as tools, they 
are quite literally being created as tools. Instead of putting up with the naturalistic 
animal and trying to ignore it as best as we can, gene technology allows us (or 
promises to allow us) to create animals that are less and less naturalistic and more and 
more analytical – increasingly perfect research tools. Mice, for instance, have been 
used for almost a century to model human diseases because they are cheap, easy to 
hold, and, most importantly, develop conditions similar to those of humans such as 
cardiovascular disease, cancer, or diabetes. However, by specific gene targeting 
(homologous recombination in embryonic stem cells) genes can now be inserted, 
deleted, modified or substituted so that other human diseases can be modelled that do 
not normally strike mice, such as cystic fibrosis or Alzheimer’s. Knockout mice, 
knockin mice, and transgenic mice can be specifically designed according to the 
needs of the customer. They are custom-made by various companies that offer their 
services to the requiring researcher: Tell us what you want and we will get it for you. 
The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) advertise Knockout mice as a resource 
that ‘will serve to further the value of the mouse as a powerful and important tool in 
the study of human health and disease.’24 Ozgene, a company specializing on the 
fabrication and marketing of genetically modified mice and rats, advertise their 
products as ‘the most sophisticated and valuable tools in functional genomics and 
drug target validation.’25  
 
The instrumental value of the mouse as a research tool is thus not only emphasized 
but it is effectively raised. Although its intrinsic value is thereby not diminished but in 
fact remains the same it gets even harder to recognize this and not to forget it. 
Genetically modified mice are still living, ‘naturalistic’ creatures but they have also 
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become artefacts into whose very being a purpose has been introduced that is not their 
own. This external purpose is the sole reason for their existence. It is not that, like 
animals raised for food, they owe their existence to the fact that we have discovered 
how to use them for our purposes but rather that they owe their very nature to what 
we are planning to do with them. Their utility is the reason not only for the fact that 
they are but also for what they are. They already enter the world as human inventions 
and consequently are increasingly regarded as the intellectual property of their 
inventors, as products for which it is thought proper to claim and award a patent.  
 
The first patent on an animal was issued in 1988 for a mouse genetically engineered 
to susceptibility for breast cancer, the so called Harvard oncomouse. Since then more 
than 500 patents on animals have been issued, including cats, dogs and primates. The 
patent was awarded despite the fact that the U.S. law prohibited that naturally 
occurring organisms be patented. But of course it was argued that the oncomouse was 
not a naturally occurring organism. It was not a product of nature but a human 
product. Although genetically modified animals may not be entirely artificial they are 
no longer entirely natural either: they are something like living artefacts or, to use the 
very fitting term that was introduced into the debate by Nicole Karafyllis, ‘biofacts’.26  
 
But doesn’t the successful creation of such biofacts mean that we have finally 
managed to bring animals into existence that actually do exist as means (to our ends)? 
We could then concede that Kant was wrong to claim that only human beings exist as 
ends in themselves and accept that most animals do too, and may still want to hold 
that animals that are specifically designed for a certain purpose do clearly not exist as 
ends in themselves but truly as means. They are not only used as instruments, they are 
instruments. And if they do exist as means, if they are instruments, then it seems it 
can hardly be inadequate to treat them as such. We would, after all, only use them the 
way they are meant to be used and treat them exactly as what they are. Our actions 
would be truthful, would be adequate to their nature and therefore morally justified. 
 
However, even a biofact is still a living creature that pursues its own ends despite the 
fact that it has been created to serve our ends. It is not in itself meant to be used in any 
way, ie, it does not exist as a tool, and its being designed as a tool does not provide 
sufficient moral justification for its exploitation. The fact that our children owe their 
existence to us does not give us the right to treat them as our property. And if we had 
conceived them for a certain purpose (eg, to take over the family business or to donate 
bone marrow to a sibling suffering from leukemia), we would still be morally 
obligated to let them live their own lives and pursue their own ends, which might turn 
out to be very different from what we intended them to be. Even if we had used gene 
technology to render them more suitable for our purposes, that would not entitle us to 
treat them as our property. The same holds for animals. We may design them at our 
convenience but that does not give us the right to treat them any way we please. It 
would if animals were things, but living beings cannot be turned into things. The 
process of reification is never complete and remains largely conceptual and 
perceptual. Biotechnology just gives us the means to consolidate our blindness 
towards the independent reality of an animal’s existence. 
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Instrumentalisation and Integrity 
 
Alan Holland once remarked that if it could only be shown that the genetic 
modification of animals is incompatible with showing respect to them then this would 
be the best case against it.27 Now, as we have seen, the genetic modification of 
animals is an attempt to turn a living organism into an instrument that is perfectly 
adapted to its intended use. The process of reification that has started as a specific 
way of looking at, thinking and talking about, and treating a living organism, is 
pushed to its limits by actually re-modeling the organism so that its instrumental value 
is raised. Thus the animal’s instrumental value becomes so prominent for our 
perception of it that its intrinsic value is effectively buried underneath it. Does this 
constitute a violation of the animal’s integrity?  
 
Biological integrity consists in the ability to live according to one’s own natural ends 
or teloi. Instrumentalization, or what I have called reification, is a process or an act 
that aims at either ignoring or eliminating these ends and replacing them with 
artificial, human-made ends. If those human-made ends are achieved at the expense of 
the animal’s natural ends then clearly its biological integrity is impaired. However, it 
is at least theoretically possible (although not very likely) that an animal is viewed 
and used as a tool without this having any effect on its ability to live according to its 
own natural ends. In other words, it could be nothing but a tool for us and not be any 
worse for it. Would its use then still be a violation of its integrity and, therefore, 
morally wrong? Or is reification morally wrong only because of what we are likely to 
do to the animal as a result, but not wrong in itself, as a specific human attitude 
towards animals, a certain way of thinking about and looking at them? 
 
It is difficult to separate an attitude from its practical application and expression. And 
indeed, if the conceptual and perceptual transformation of a living animal into a 
resource, an instrument, or a mere thing, had no effect whatsoever on the way we treat 
animals, Tom Regan would hardly have regarded it as the ‘fundamental wrong’. So 
perhaps we should concede that the instrumental attitude towards animals is not in 
itself a violation of their integrity. However, it seems that the respect we owe them 
(due to their being living creatures with a good of their own and their leading lives 
that we can recognize as intrinsically valuable) covers more than just our actions. It 
does not only demand that we not restrict their ability to pursue their natural ends but 
also that we acknowledge their true nature (according to which they are not things) in 
our thinking.  
 
The Kantian imperative that we never treat each other merely as a means but always 
at the same time as an end does not primarily command a certain kind of behaviour 
towards others but first of all a certain kind of mental attitude. In our daily lives we 
often treat others as means to our ends. For instance when we go to a shop and buy a 
newspaper the shopkeeper is being used by us as a means to acquire what we want. 
There is nothing wrong with that, as long as we don’t forget that the shopkeeper is 
also a human being who does not exist for our convenience and who deserves our 
respect. This respect is something we expect from others even where it doesn’t make 
much difference to what actually happens. The shopkeeper would be deeply offended 
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if he learned that we regarded him as a mere instrument without any intrinsic value 
whatsoever. And he would be offended even if we treated him no differently. The 
point is that we do not want to be ‘used’ even when we are used, that is, we expect 
others not to think of us merely as a means but always also as an end. If we find out 
that we have in fact been treated merely as a means we are not only disappointed but 
morally outraged. We feel that it is morally wrong to ‘use’ someone like this, to relate 
to people as if they were tools. We are not primarily concerned about the possible or 
actual effects of being used but about the fact itself. Neither do we think that the 
wrong consists in our feeling used. Rather, we object very strongly to our being used. 
Even if we never learned about it we would still not want it to happen. Even if nothing 
in the actual course of events had been different it would still make a difference to us. 
We feel that by being regarded merely as an instrument our individual reality is being 
denied. We are living, conscious beings that exist for their own sake and not for 
anyone else’s, and we want this fact to be acknowledged and our identity as not-
things to be respected. Yet animals, too, are living, conscious beings that exist for 
their own sake, and although they cannot demand respect for it they do deserve it just 
as much as humans do. 
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